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Ethos Issue 7, Jan 2010
Opinion: Looking for Trouble
Gary Klein

It is not just that weak signals are hard to detect and understand. They
are also hard to communicate and difficult to take seriously, warns
naturalistic decision making guru Gary Klein.
INTRODUCTION
Every government has a
responsibility to identify
potential crises in order to
avoid them or ameliorate their effects.
The sooner a government can identify a
problem, the easier the job of avoiding
or containing it because fewer resources
will be needed, and more time will be
available to mobilise those resources.
Therefore, government agencies may
attempt to pick up the weak signals that
indicate that a crisis may be brewing.
They may develop systematic methods
and technologies for scanning more
and more data, and for connecting
the dots. They may strive for higher
levels of accuracy, seeking to root out
errors that might lead to mistakes of
omission (failing to spot weak signals) or
commission (crying wolf). A metaphor
would be the use of space-based
telescopes to spot asteroids that might
be heading towards our planet, in the
hope that with enough time we might
find a way to deflect the orbit of such
asteroids away from us.
While I think that all of these steps
are valuable, I have some concerns with
each of them. I worry that the way an
agency pursues each of these steps can
increase its vulnerability, if it is not
careful. The steps I have described above
emphasise the gathering of information
over analysis. They emphasise technology
and procedures over expertise. They are
best suited for recurring crises, rather
than a first-of-a-kind crisis.
Returning to the metaphor of a
killer asteroid, the threat of asteroids
is not new. It is a recurrent crisis. Our
planet has been shaken by asteroids in
the past. They are cited as a likely reason
for the extinction of dinosaurs, and for
a massive explosion in Siberia in 1908.
Asteroid-hunting is a poor metaphor
for the challenge of detecting first-of-a-kind crises such as the airborne
suicide attacks of 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the collapse of Enron, and the current
global economic meltdown. First-of-a-kind crises correspond to the black
swans that Taleb has discussed.1 Thus, in
hindsight, the weak signals were there
in plain view for 9/11, for Pearl Harbor,
for the collapse of Enron, for the US
economic crisis in the fall of 2007.
Most people missed the weak signals
because, as Karl Weick has pointed out
in his book Sensemaking in Organizations,2
we understand the significance of the
weak signals only in hindsight. Weak
signals do not announce themselves,
particularly for first-of-a-kind crises. In
hindsight, we can see the signs of the
US housing bubble several years ago.
We can shake our heads at the granting
of home loans to people with limited
resources. But there have been bubbles
before this. What made this bubble so
devastating was that it was associated
with lax regulations, insufficient risk
analyses by the Wall Street investment
banks, infusion of capital from thriving
Asian economies, a perversion of the
loan insurance practices for mortgage-backed
securities so that they accelerated
risk rather than dampened it, loss of
transparency for financial instruments,
and so forth. Each of these signals was
commented on at the time, but it was
the combination of these factors that led
to the crisis.
In The March of Folly, Barbara Tuchman
described a number of world events
that seem inevitable in hindsight, but
were invisible to the decision makers at
the time.3 Gathering more data would
not help decision makers who cannot
understand what the data mean, and
computational models work best by
extrapolating from previous events
and historical trends. Computational
models assume continuity with the past
and are even less sensitive to first-of-a-kind
events than people are. Using these
models is like driving a car by looking in
one’s rear-view mirror. The sophisticated
computational models used by Wall
Street were no match for the realities of
the fall of 2007.
Not only are weak signals hard to
spot, but when keen observers do pick
them up they usually have trouble
convincing others to pay attention. In
each of the cases I listed above—Pearl
Harbor, 9/11, the economic meltdown—a
few people identified the weak signals
and tried to warn others. In each case,
the warning was ignored. It is not just
that weak signals are hard to detect and
hard to understand. They are hard to communicate because they are so unusual
and unlikely that they do not fit the
mindset of the decision makers.
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