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Ethos Issue 7, Jan 2010
Enterprise Risk Management:
Strengthening Singapore’s Advantage
Ang Hak Seng
The risk incurred by organisations
that have become very adept at scenario-based
vulnerability management, and
which then cease to plan beyond Level
2, is to be blindsided by inadequate
scenarios or unforeseen circumstances.
For example, assuming a discrete
number of terrorist tactics will blind
security forces to terrorist innovations
such as the September 11 attacks.
Therefore, effective strategies should
not rely on knowing the specific source
or nature of a risk, only its dimension
of operation. Approaches to managing
such vulnerabilities include diffused capacity building, de-correlation of
risks, business continuity plans and
resilience plans.
Finally, at Level 3 ("Unknown
Unknowns"), even the dimension of risk
is unknown. Besides building strong
sensing mechanisms to give some early
warning, organisations need to be able
to react quickly to events. Therefore, the
ability to assemble emergency response
teams on the fly and subsequently
dissolve them quickly to restore
normalcy is crucial in dealing with
strategic surprises and
black swans.
Such "Hastily Formed Networks" or
HFNs are a key to systemic responsiveness.
This capability to group and ungroup
task forces swiftly was an important
factor in Singapore’s successful battle
with SARS in 2004. Similarly, when
the financial crisis struck in late 2008,
governments which had the ability to
react quickly saw better outcomes than
those where bureaucratic obstacles
slowed down decision-making and
response. By the same token, enhancing
flexibility in planning (for example,
adopting quarter-to-quarter planning
frameworks) and flexibility in problem
solving (e.g., developing HFNs) would
allow better preparation for such
uncertainty. This has implications on
the way government organises itself.
There could be a lot more organically
and spontaneously formed need-based
groupings, rather than more rigid
structures that are costly to maintain.
Seizing Opportunities
Implementations of ERM that focus
solely on managing vulnerabilities fail
to recognise the value of a risk-oriented
approach in seizing opportunities.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis
would suffice to analyse opportunities
at relatively low levels of uncertainty
(Level 1). Given discrete options, portfolio
management and game theory may shed
light on the best set of opportunities
to pursue.
However, true opportunities begin
to reveal themselves in regions of
greater uncertainty (Level 2). Here, Blue
Ocean thinking2 helps to systematically
explore new opportunities. The value
innovator is the person who is able to
make smart trade-offs, sensing where
risk must be taken to exploit new
opportunities. Conversely, there must
be significant uncertainty for such
strategies to prevail.
In Level 3, where even the dimensions
of risk cannot be fathomed, seizing
opportunities no longer relies on a
specific framework. Instead, opportunities
are best sought through an appropriate
market system which encourages
experimentation and accepts failure.
By the law of large numbers, a small
number of entrepreneurs will find breakthrough opportunities. Such market
systems require government action to
promote free market forces: by providing
accessible infrastructure, making available
seed funding and removing market
entry barriers. In Singapore, however,
given our small size, it may be necessary
to "strategically direct" innovation by
identifying a promising industry, sector
or research area. The performance of
these attempts should not be measured
only by the number and value of successes, but also the learning value
that we extract from each experiment.
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Strategy Canvas: From Police to Policing
FIGURE 5: STRATEGY CANVAS: TRADING-OFF RISKS AND OPPORTUNITY
In the chart above, the areas in which
value is given up represent the risk
which is taken, given limited resources,
in order to create value in other areas.
In the example of the Singapore
Police Force, the entire frontline policing
system was overhauled in the late 1990s
and upgraded in the mid 2000s. While
the iconic Neighbour Police Post system1
was working well, SPF decided that the
future would not be reached through
perfecting past approaches, and it
deliberately reduced counter services
to redirect resources to areas such as public education and problem-solving
capabilities. In doing so, instead of only
having 13,000 full-time police officers to
safeguard Singapore, the SPF potentially
recruited all 5 million Singaporeans in
the fight against crime and terrorism.
~ Ang Hak Seng
| NOTE |
| 01. |
The Neighbourhood Police Post (NPP) system was
implemented by the Singapore Police Force in 1983 as part
of its community policing strategy. This was re-engineered
in 1997 with the introduction of the Neighbourhood
Police Centre (NPC) system to provide one-stop services
for members of the public, integrating service delivery,
response and investigation functions. |
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