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Ethos Issue 6, Jul 2009

Krugman, Wolf and the Roots of the Financial Crisis
The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008
Author : Paul Krugman
Published by : New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2008

Fixing Global Finance
Author : Martin Wolf
Published by : Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008

Reviewed by He Ruimin

Two heavyweight observers of global economics have weighed in with their views on the global financial crisis. Amid a rash of books seeking to contextualise, describe, and offer solutions to the current economic tsunami, the recent tomes of Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman and respected commentator Martin Wolf offer two refreshing yet differing insights on the most pressing economic dilemma of present times.1

Both Krugman and Wolf are economics professors who bring a sound understanding of economic theory into their analyses. Both comment on economics for major newspapers—Krugman for the New York Times, and Wolf for the Financial Times. However, the transatlantic difference shows. Krugman has penned a macroeconomics primer suitable for those without deep training. Informal, lucid and free of academic footnotes, The Return of Depression Economics employs simple metaphors such as the "Baby-sitting Coop" analogy to explain recessions and policy responses. In contrast, Wolf has put forward a decidedly more sombre and intellectually ambitious volume, based on a series of academic lectures, that requires more effort to take in but which ultimately provides a more sophisticated analysis of international capital flows.

CONTEXTUALISING THE CRISIS
Both Krugman and Wolf started working on their books before the onset of the current crisis: their books offer a broader perspective of recent economic history.

Krugman surveys a string of recent financial crises, including Japan, Southeast Asia, Britain, Sweden, Russia and Latin America, and argues that almost all of them can similarly be traced to asset booms, imperfect regulations, and moral hazards—which eventually led to over-borrowing and defaults. Wolf notes, the current crisis notwithstanding, that these problems have been especially prevalent in emerging markets, which tend to have weaker governance and macro-economic foundations.

Both authors observe that banking and currency crises have become more frequent since the 1970s, due to financial globalisation and the resultant upsurge in international capital flows. Wolf argues that there are limits to accountability, trust and safeguards when investing across borders. At any hint of a crisis, international investors are more likely than domestic financiers to pull their money out. Krugman describes why investors fleeing from a particular market are likely to simultaneously pull out from emerging markets altogether, thereby causing self-fulfilling contagion effects. Separately, Krugman also highlights the role of hedge funds in exacerbating crises through speculative attacks.

Krugman and Wolf also agree that financial crises translate into economic crises at great cost and with dire results. While the consequences would differ across countries, they are likely to include unemployment, poverty, lost output, increased public debt, and some degree of social and political unrest. With more frequent economic shocks in future, my sense is that governments will have to learn to mitigate these social consequences in a cost-effective way.

HOW THE CRISIS CAME ABOUT
Both Krugman and Wolf note that low interest rates played a significant role in creating the housing asset bubble that triggered the current crisis. However, they attribute responsibility differently. Krugman puts the blame squarely on former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for his failure to raise interest rates in order to rein in irrational exuberance in the financial markets.

In contrast, Wolf takes a wider "Savings Glut" view that is consistent with the general thrust of his Financial Times columns. Wolf suggests that the current crisis is a consequence of previous emerging markets crises. The painful outcomes of these crises encouraged many emerging economies to avoid borrowing, keep exchange rates down, sustain strong currency positions, and accumulate official reserves. These resulted in a global savings glut that the US, as borrower and spender of last resort, was compelled to absorb and consume. Under these circumstances, the US Federal Reserve had to pursue an expansionary monetary policy to generate adequate domestic demand in order to avoid deflation. Hence, the low interest rates.

 

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