Ethos Issue 6, Jul 2009
The End of the World
(Economy) as We Know It
Adeline Aw, Lee Chor Pharn and Wee Shu Lin

“…After this crisis, the world is not going to be the same again.
This is not just another cyclical downturn and recovery.
The world’s economy is undergoing a structural shift.”
-Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
in Parliament, 27 May 2009
Many economists have described
the current economic and
financial crisis as the
most severe economic recession since
World War Two. The crisis has indeed
had far-ranging consequences: oncemighty
banks and financial institutions
have evaporated; major industries are
experiencing significant consolidation;
thousands of factories all over the world
have shut down, and millions of workers
have lost their jobs. Some economists
have even speculated that the world
was poised for a second Great Depression.
It is still too early to determine if
the global economy has indeed seen
the worst of the downturn as there are
simply too many uncertainties that
could destabilise any sort of recovery.
However, it has become increasingly clear that the global economy will not
revert to its pre-crisis status quo.
The years leading up to the
financial crisis were marked by very
benign economic conditions leading
to structural imbalances in the global
economy. At the global level, the
developed economies saw strong
growth in credit growth and private
consumption, while the level of savings
plummeted.1 Emerging economies
redirected their excess savings to
finance consumption in developed
economies. This cycle reinforced trade
interdependence between the G3
nations (US, Japan and the European
Union) and emerging Asian economies
and meant that the Asian economic
growth became more, rather than less,
dependent on G3 growth.
The current financial and economic
crisis has unravelled this intertwined
relationship, which the historian Niall
Ferguson has described as “Chimerica”.2 Consumption in the US has fallen,
perhaps for the foreseeable future.3 Exports from Asia to the developed
countries have collapsed. Singapore has been affected severely, with its
economy expected to experience its
largest contraction since 1965. To
date, Singapore’s economic success has
largely been attributed to the openness
of its economy and its concentration
on activities which largely serve G3
demand. But with the unravelling
of “Chimerica” bringing long-term
change to the global demand landscape,
Singapore, along with much of Asia, is
likely to face significant challenges in
the post-crisis future.
LEGACY EFFECTS FROM THE CRISIS:
TIPPING POINTS FOR THE WORLD
The crisis of 2008–2009 will have
at least four legacy effects that
could permanently alter the global
demand landscape.
• Rising public debt in the US, Japan
and Europe has escalated with the
high cost of recovery fiscal spending.
If these countries do not offer
viable and sustainable solutions
to reduce debt levels in the longer
term, investors’ confidence in assets
denominated in these currencies
could diminish. In any case, investors
would also be wary that high levels
of public debt now could lead to
high levels of taxation later. Reduced
foreign appetite for G3 assets (in
particular US assets) will impair these governments’ abilities to
invest in areas such as education,
infrastructure and social safety
nets, reducing their long-term
economic potential.
• Increased government intervention in the financial sector may stifle
the innovation necessary for wealth
creation and the financing of the
real economy. Over the long run,
private consumption and growth
levels may be muted if access to
credit is restricted.
• Creeping protectionism could
reduce the overall level of
global trade and affect the main
mechanism that has supported
Chimerica’s prosperity. Blatant forms of protectionism, such
as tariff wars, seem less likely.
But more subtle forms of
protectionism, embedded as
clauses in many fiscal stimulus
plans, may hinder the free flow of
trade too.
• Fundamental changes in G3
consumption behaviour could
affect the growth path of the world
economy. US consumption spending,
in particular, accounts for onethird
of global growth in private
consumption. Hence, any decline in
G3 consumption, arising from higher
levels of unemployment and the need
to save more, would significantly
affect global GDP growth.
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