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Ethos Issue 6, Jul 2009

Singapore’s Political Economy: Two Paradoxes
Bryan Caplan

Understanding the paradoxes of Singapore sheds new light on political economy in general. While most democracies have frequent partisan turnover at the national level, subnational democratic politics are often as one-sided as in Singapore. In the broader world though, such forms of one-party democracy do not seem to depend on the delivery of remarkable economic performance. Is this because the relative importance of loyalty, deference, and resignation varies? Or did Singaporeans simply have the good fortune to put its trust in men who happened to deserve it?

Once political economists have a better understanding of one-party democracy, they will be ready to take a second look at national politics. Why exactly is it so difficult for one party in a democracy to stay on top at the national level? One interesting hypothesis is simply that people are more interested in—and therefore less resigned about—national politics. But this raises further questions: What determines whether a given democratic contest will catch voters’ interest? And under what circumstances does greater interest lead to worse policies?

The case of Singapore is a fascinating challenge to time-tested models of how democracy works. But more importantly, the mechanisms underlying Singaporean political economy are probably at work in every democracy. These mechanisms are not unique to Singapore, just uniquely visible.

 

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